This essay reviews the literature on the role of financial factors in the Depression, and draws some lessons that have more general relevance for the study of the Depression and for macroeconomics. I argue that much of the recent progress that has been made in understanding some of the most important and puzzling aspects of financial-real links in the Depression followed a paradigm shift in economics. A central, neglected theoretical piece of the story for financial factors was the allocative effects of imperfections in capital markets, which can imply links between disruptions in financial markets and subsequent economic activity. Also, the increasing emphasis on learning and "path-dependence" in economics has helped to explain why financial shocks during the 1930s were so severe and why policy-makers failed to prevent the Depression.
expenditure" shocks to explain the origins of the Depression (Hickman, 1973; Temin, 1976; Gordon and Wilcox, 1981) . Meltzer (1976) argued that international monetary forces, driven by misalignment of prices across countries, may have caused early price and output reductions through the price-specie-flow mechanism.2 These early debates about the sources of disturbances continue and much remains unsettled (Bordo, 1986 ). Conclusions about the relative importance of monetary and autonomous-expenditure shocks have turned out to be quite sensitive to empirical methodology and different researchers' interpretations of observed time-series relationships. Large, autonomous consumption reductions in 1929-1930, posited by Temin (1976) , have been confirmed by Hall (1986) and Romer (1990) , but questioned by Gordon and Wilcox (1981) , Gordon and Veitch (1986) , and others. Gordon and Wilcox (1981) find that the association between lagged money and current income is weak for the 1930s, while the association between contemporaneous movements is stronger, which they argue is more consistent with endogeneity of money. Monetarists respond that the relationship between money and GNP is subject to lags of variable and 2According to Hume's price-specie-flow mechanism, international price disequilibrium brings forth endogenous changes in international flows of goods, and offsetting flows of specie, which realign price levels across countries. uncertain length, and cite evidence that banking crises in the 1930s are associated with changes in the money multiplier (for example Anderson and Butkiewitz, 1980; Boughton and Wicker, 1979; Schwartz, 1981; Trescott, 1984) . As Wicker (1989) points out, however, the association between bank failures and money-multiplier changes need not imply exogenous change in the money supply, since both may have followed income and interest rate changes. Indeed, the most likely exogenous source of change in the money stock on a priori grounds, the first banking crisis of 1930, may have been primarily of local importance and seems to have had little effect on national economic activity (Friedman and Schwartz, 1963, p. 313; Wicker, 1980 Wicker, , 1982 , although it did mark a change in the risk premium for low-grade corporate securities (Hamilton, 1987) . In a similar vein, White (1984) argues that the first banking crisis of 1930 was not an exceptional event, or a turning point for the banking system, but rather represented a continuation of patterns of bank failure during recession experienced in earlier years.
Recently, some convincing evidence has emerged of exogenous disturbances in the market for money balances during the Depression. Ironically, the clearest evidence produced on the importance of exogenous changes in the money supply pertains to the pre-October 1929 period (which had always been viewed by monetarists and non-monetarists alike as a period of tight monetary policy), and to subsequent influences on the money supply more moderate than the sharp contractions of the money stock during the banking crises emphasized by Friedman and Schwartz. Field (1984a Field ( , 1984b showed that securities market trading increased the demand for money in the late 1920s, and that this increase in demand was not offset by expansion in supply. Indeed, the expansion in demand worked in concert with the contraction in money supply in 1929 to increase interest rates and reduce prices and economic activity. Wheelock (1990) (Toma, 1989) . Wheelock (1989a Wheelock ( , 1989b Wheelock ( , 1992 provided supporting descriptive and econometric evidence for the stability of the Federal Reserve's reaction function over the interwar period, which caused the Fed to misread credit conditions in early 1931, and to fail to expand the money supply in late 1931, even after it became aware of tight credit-market conditions. Consistent with its long-standing policies, in early 1931, the Fed interpreted high excess reserves and low interest rates-which were the result of a massive worldwide flight to liquidity by individuals and banks-as signs of easy money, which warranted higher interest rates to preserve external balance. After Britain left gold in September 1931, outflows of reserves from the United States prompted tightening of monetary policy to preserve external balance.
This reaction function had been derived from previous experience and by the prevailing doctrines of central bank policy under the gold standard (Temin, 1989) . This policy may have been appropriate in some circumstances, but it increased the fragility of the financial system and contributed to the decline of money, credit, economic activity and prices in 1931. One can lament poor policy by the Fed in the 1930s, and it is true that some criticized Fed policies at the time (thus wise advice was available, in principle), but one cannot expect the Fed to have learned the lessons of the Great Depression before it happened.
A Change in Paradigm, New Questions, and Old Answers For two decades after Monetary History, the literature on the Great Depression argued cause and effect essentially within the confines of the neoclassical synthesis that reigned in macroeconomics in the 1960s and 1970s. In this context, financial factors are identified primarily with money-supply shocks and stock market influences, which in turn affect investment and consumption demand through interest elasticities, wealth effects, and changing perceptions of uncertainty (Temin, 1976; Gordon and Veitch, 1986; Romer, 1990) .
But a transformation in thinking about the role of financial markets in the economy was under way. Economists began to formulate theoretical arguments of why conditions in financial markets might not be accurately captured by the aggregate value of capital in the stock market, the supply of money, and "the" real or nominal interest rate. Theoretical models of credit allocation under asymmetric information imply that access to external finance may be inhibited because of information costs faced by sources of outside funding. Under these circumstances, "insiders"-firm managers and financial intermediaries with an ongoing relationship with the firm-can supply funds at lower cost than "outsiders" -relatively uninformed stockholders and bondholders. An important implication of this literature is that changes in the allocation of wealth in the economy can increase the cost of outside finance if they reduce the available supply of "insider" funding. For example, decreases in the wealth of insider shareholders, or reductions in bank net worth that inhibit bank lending capacity, will increase firms' reliance on outside funds and drive up the cost of those funds. Furthermore, the demands for assets and the pricing of assets will reflect the extent to which assets are "liquid"-that is, the extent to which their value is a matter of common knowledge. Mishkin (1976) , the changing distribution of wealth, not just aggregate wealth, should matter for aggregate consumption. Mishkin (1978) argued that in addition to the depressive effect of aggregate wealth reduction on consumption in the 1930s, the debt deflation (a reallocation of wealth away from indebted consumers) reduced aggregate consumption demand.
Mishkin's research, with its emphasis on the depressive effects of excess leverage and the allocative consequences of wealth redistribution in the presence of capital market imperfections, marked an important change in the direction of the literature on financial factors in the Depression. However, his contribution still remained within the confines of the neoclassical synthesis, as part of the explanation for the early autonomous contraction in consumption demand. Bernanke's (1983) study of the consequences of financial disruption during the Depression took Mishkin's arguments a step further. Bernanke argued that in the presence of capital market imperfections, the destruction of intermediaries and the reduction in borrowers' net worth-both the results of debt deflation-reduced investment in the 1930s by increasing the marginal cost of funding. Reductions in firm net worth increase credit costs for firms because as debt deflation erodes the equity stake of firm "insiders," the ratio of external to internal claims on the firm rises. Under asymmetric information this increases the marginal cost of external finance. Debt deflation also erodes the net worth of banks, causing some banks to fail, and others to tighten their credit standards to avoid runs by depositors. Thus access to "inside" debt from relatively well-informed banks is also curtailed. The financial devastation of 1929 to 1933 had always been given prominence in accounts of the Depression. Bernanke's (1983) contribution was to combine theory and empirical evidence to argue that financial collapse was more than a symptom of economic decline; financial collapse deepened the Depression by hampering the efficient allocation of capital.
In retrospect, given the dramatic changes that occurred in financial markets from 1929 to 1933, it may seem surprising that it took so long to develop such an argument. During this period the ratio of high-to-low rated bond debt fell from 2.4 to 0.3 (Hickman, 1960 Bernanke's research was informed by new models of capital market failure, but these were not the main motivation for his approach to modeling connections between financial collapse and real decline in the 1930s. The search for a new paradigm of financial-real interaction followed from an incompleteness in the earlier literature on the Depression, which Bernanke focused on in his introduction (p. 257):
One problem is that there is no theory of monetary effects [per se] on the real economy that can explain protracted nonneutrality. Another is that the reductions of the money supply in this period seems quantitatively insufficient to explain the subsequent falls in output.
According to Bernanke, the decline in the efficiency of the economy's financial allocation mechanism induced by the reduction of banks' lending capabilities and the collapse of producers' and consumers' net worth should be thought of as long-lived shocks to financial technology, and therefore, can explain the persistent decline in output through a rise in the "cost of credit intermediation." Indeed, if shocks to credit costs mainly constrained the growth of newer, technologically innovative, "information-intensive" firms with relatively less access to credit facilities in the 1930s, the long-term consequences for economic activity might have been especially pronounced (Hunter, 1982; Calomiris and Hubbard, 1991).
Another weakness in the IS-LM approach to modeling real financial links during the Depression was its dependence on price stickiness. Explanations of economic decline during the Depression that rely on reductions in real money balances, autonomous changes in expenditure, or a price-specie-flow mechanism all assume price rigidity or price disequilibrium. But as Figure 1 shows, wholesale prices and bank deposits show close contemporaneous co-movements even at high frequencies, which argues against the assumption of protracted price adjustment, at least for wholesale prices.4
Bernanke cited (and likely was motivated by) the writings of several 1930s chroniclers of credit market conditions and economists who emphasized persistent disruption to financial markets as one of the main continuing problems of the Depression after 1933, and who viewed deflation as a destabilizing influence.5 The economists on this list include Irving Fisher (1933), whose classic 4It is also interesting to recall that Gordon and Wilcox (1981) found the strongest association between money and economic activity was essentially contemporaneous. Calomiris and Hubbard (1989) found similar results for financial-real association during the pre-World War I period and argued that strong contemporary association made more sense in the context of a credit squeeze (in which flows of goods may be abruptly discontinued) than in a standard monetary disequilibrium story, which should involve a protracted process of portfolio and price adjustment. 5Calomiris and Hubbard (1989) argue that chroniclers and economists before Friedman and Schwartz generally used the phrase "money market" to mean the market for short-term credit, and that pre-Federal Reserve real-financial links were properly seen by contemporaries as the result of shocks to credit supply (partly involving unanticipated deflation). statement of the debt-deflation cycle mirrors many of Bernanke's arguments. Perhaps the most prominent advocate of this position in the 1930s was Keynes (1931 Keynes ( [1963 , pp. 175-76) who wrote:
... there is scarcely any class of property, except real estate, however useful and important to the welfare of the community, the current money value of which has not suffered an enormous decline. This has happened in a community which is so organised that a veil of money is, as I have said, interposed over a wide field between the actual asset and the wealth owner. The ostensible proprietor of the actual asset has financed it by borrowing money from the actual owner of wealth. Furthermore, it is largely through the banking system that all this has been arranged. That is to say, the banks have, for a consideration, interposed their guarantee. They stand between the real borrower and the real lender. They have given their guarantee to the real lender; and this guarantee is only good if the money value of the asset belonging to the real borrower is worth the money which has been advanced on it. It is for this reason that a decline in the money values so severe as that which we are now experiencing threatens the solidity of the whole financial structure.
In his empirical work, Bernanke showed that both shocks to firms' and banks' net worth were significant (statistically and economically) for explaining the fall in output during the 1930s, even after taking account of monetary shocks. Indicators of declining net worth of banks and firms-including deflation, corporate failures, bank failures, and the bond risk spread-all were important as predictors of economic decline over and above monetary shocks.
The new focus on deflation and financial disruption also had implications for the way the Depression was transmitted across countries. on certain firms, and thus reduces their creditworthiness and the value of their securities in the market. Mishkin (1991 a) analyzed yield spreads for bonds and stock price movements during historical financial panics and confirmed a "flight to quality" (that is, an increased penalty for firms whose prospects suffer an asymmetric-information discount). He applied this analysis to bond and stock markets in 1930, and argued for a similar "flight to quality" at the beginning of the recession of 1937. Mishkin's analysis of securities markets provides a theoretical explanation for time variation in the risk premium of stocks and bonds by linking these changes to exogenous disruptions in financial markets throughout U.S. history.8
Implications of the "New View"
The non-monetary propagation hypothesis has at least three interesting implications that distinguish it from the earlier monetarist position.
First, the financial-propagation view of the Depression implies that a money-supply shock of a given magnitude will have a larger effect if it occurs at a time of high leverage, or in an economy with a poorly diversified, geographically fragmented banking system like that of the United States. While there is some continuing disagreement between these authors and Cecchetti (1992) over precisely how much of the deflation was anticipated at short time horizons, all parties agree that there was substantial unanticipated deflation even at quarterly frequencies. Furthermore, Evans and Wachtel (1991) argue that over longer-term frequencies most of the deflation was unanticipated. They find that agents systematically overestimated the probability of a return to a zero-inflation regime rather than continuing deflation. Given that debt contracts often were written with durations greater than several months, the rise in the real value of long-term debt that occurred must have been unanticipated. Kuvin (1936, p. 36) estimates total long-term debt as roughly $84 billion in 1929 (at a time when national income was roughly $87 billion, and short-term debt was roughly $150 billion, as estimated respectively 't)Anticipated deflation still could have had a depressive effect on the economy, as argued by Temin (1989) Goldsmith, 1962, v. 3, pp. 67, 75) , typically had durations of three to five years (Snowden and Bu-Saba, 1992).
New Challenges and Interpretations
The new view's emphasis on deflation prompted several cross-country comparisons of the role and transmission of deflation. In notable recent work, Haubrich's (1990) study of financial-real interactions during the Depression applies empirical methods similar to Bernanke (1983) to Canada. He finds that measures of financial distress have no economic or statistical significance for predicting economic activity in Canada. Haubrich interprets this as evidence that without bank failures (which were absent in Canada's increasingly concentrated nationwide branch-banking system), financial distress has little macroeconomic consequence. However, there are at least four reasons to doubt the general proposition that macroeconomic financial distress depends on widespread bank failures, and the application of this proposition to the 1930s. In an interesting study that has received little attention, Hunter (1982) provides more detailed evidence along these lines. She groups firms by size categories and examines differences in firms' balance sheet changes during the Depression. She argues that corporate liquidity preference increased substantially during the Depression, but increases in liquidity were confined mainly to large firms. Large firms were the only ones capable of improving their liquidity positions because of their superior access to financial markets. Hunter also compares the relative liquidity positions of small firms to large firms during the Depression with that of other periods and finds that the financial stringency of the Depression was associated with a uniquely large difference between the liquidity positions of large and small firms. This evidence provides more direct support for Bernanke's position using standards of comparison suggested by Temin (1989) .
Calomiris and Hubbard (1991) also provide evidence supporting the view that the mid-1930s were a time when many firms faced high costs of external finance. Using firm-level data on dividend responses to the undistributed profits tax in 1936 and 1937, corroborated by data on costs of securities issuing, they find substantial heterogeneity in the costs of finance across firms, and that a large number of firms (roughly a quarter of all firms paying taxes) had a shadow price differential between internally generated and externally obtained funds in excess of 20 percent. The investment of firms with high external finance costs was highly sensitive to internally generated funds, while other firms' investment was not.
In summary, cross-sectional evidence confirms Bernanke's (1983) interpretation of time series patterns. The costs of external finance were quite high during the Depression, these costs were particularly high for small, growing enterprises. High finance costs reflected both the reduced creditworthiness of firms as well as a contraction in the availability of "inside" bank debt.
Conclusion
The study of financial factors during the Great Depression has seen much progress over the last 30 years. Friedman and Schwartz (1963) provided a strong foundation of facts and provocative interpretations on which subsequent research has built. This body of research also has shaped the way economists think about monetary policy and financial markets more generally. For example, many macroeconomists now believe that a large fraction of macroeconomic disturbances have long lives, that monetary policy operates largely through its effect of the real supply of bank credit, and that price flexibility can be disruptive if it takes the form of unanticipated deflation. Those views are compatible with, if not caused by, the last decade of research on financial factors during the Depression.
In addition, some insights from the study of the Great Depression seem to have methodological significance for the study of macroeconomic fluctuations, not all of which has been absorbed by macroeconomics.
First, the literature on financial factors emphasizes the importance of modeling the economy as an historical process. Prior experience governs the information available to private agents and policy-makers, the stubbornness of expectations, the balance sheets of agents, and the vulnerability of the economy to disturbances. The "deep parameters" of the economy (which depend on agents' information) are always changing. The reaction of the economy to exogenous shocks depends on interactions between shocks and time-varying state variables. Much progress in understanding financial factors during the Depression over the past 30 years has come from a willingness to take a careful look at specific moments of time and place them in an historical context, rather than collapse history into a long time series of aggregate data.
Second, recent research on financial factors in the Depression also has shown that panel and cross-section studies, which provide comparisons across countries and firms, can offer more insight than the repeated torture of the same domestic time-series aggregates, and such analysis does not depend on implausible assumptions of stationarity. The desirability of a greater emphasis on panel data to answer macroeconomic questions is further suggested by available empirical evidence that financing costs vary importantly across firms. As Schumpeter emphasized, business cycles are often driven by the activities of certain classes of firms and industries. The representative agent or firm approach to understanding macroeconomics is liable to leave key actors out of the play.
While financial factors can explain persistent reductions in the efficiency of capital allocations and economic activity, one must combine financial influences with other factors to explain protracted underutilization of resources (that is, unemployment and excess capacity). Here too recent research has shown the usefulness of abandoning the representative agent or firm assumption (Bernstein, 1987; Bresnahan and Raff, 1991, 1992; Margo, 1991 Margo, , 1992 Wallis, 1989) . These authors have emphasized that the disruption of the early years of the Depression brought endogenous responses in technological choice, the composition of consumption demand, and demands for labor skills which had important effects on aggregate production, capacity utilization, and employment. Like the new literature on financial factors, this body of research offers insights into how disturbances had long-lived effects on economic activity during the 1930s through their influences on the long-run survival of different firms and different technologies. For example, Bresnahan and Raff (1991, 1992) argue that cyclical decline ("shake-out") hastened technological change in the automobile industry. Financial factors are unlikely to provide the entire explanation for how early adverse shocks were transformed into the Great Depression.
A final lesson from the Depression for modern macroeconomics is the peril of assuming that shocks to technology (including changes in the cost of credit intermediation) are independent of shocks to monetary policy or other influences on "aggregate demand." Some recent macroeconomic studies of the post-World War II period assume independence of aggregate demand and supply shocks, and assume that aggregate-demand shocks have transitory effects while aggregate-supply shocks have permanent effects. These identifying restrictions permit one to measure the relative importance of aggregate supply and demand shocks for causing variation in GNP (Blanchard and Quah, 1988; Shapiro and Watson, 1988) . This approach results in large measured contributions to output variance at business cycle frequencies from supply shocks, which often are identified with exogenous technological change.
But this separation of aggregate-supply and aggregate-demand innovations is hard to justify from the perspective of the history of the Great Depression. A common emphasis of recent research on the Depression, including but not limited to work on financial factors, is that disturbances to aggregate demand like money-supply shocks may have had persistent effects on output through endogenous changes in firms' and consumers' balance sheets, technological shake-out, and endogenous changes in demands for different types of labor and consumption goods.'2 In other words, monetary and other demand shocks had persistent effects on output, excess capacity, and unemployment through various channels connecting them to changes in the underlying structure of the economy. 120f course, the notions that shocks to credit markets have a long-run impact on output, that technological change is endogenous to demand shocks, and that recessions are periods of reallocation of capital among firms that reflect heterogeneity with respect to technological opportunities and vulnerability to credit supply shocks are not new to macroeconomics. These were the basic building blocks of Schumpeter's (1939) theory of business cycles.
